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Abstract: This paper will concentrates in explaining the application
of game theoretical approach to gain information in the business
strategy. The brief explanation about game and strategies are
particularly concern with applying the theoretical approach to the real
life. Auction, decision making process and e-commerce are identifying
the role of the game in helping manager or the player to win the
competition in the market.
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I. IINTRODUCTION
Information and game theory are complementary factors. The game needs
information to find the best strategy in order to win the game. Players of the
game have to be aware of the information provided by the enemies because they
were probably gives wrong impressions. According to Davis, foreword from Oskar
Morgenstern, 1930 : the special and the simply things from game theoretical
approach is deals with decision making process, information gives choices of
strategy to players to make decision with all possibilities condition that may
happen. The blending of player’s mutual and conflicting interests that makes
game theory fascinating.
Game theory is a branch of mathematics with direct applications in
economics, sociology, and psychology which first devised by John Von Neuman
with his first publication in 1944 which is “Theory of Games and Economic Behaviour”
then later contributions were made by John Nash, A.W Tucker and others (http:/
/whatis.techtarget.com/definition/0,,sid9_gci803205,00.html)
IBM’s Founder Thomas J. Watson said: “Business is a game , the greatest
game in the world if you know how to play it “, (Mcmilan, 1996), however the
business negotiations are essentially the game of predicting what other person
will do. In addition, faced with employees, sub contractors, salespeople and others,
manager are continually called upon to make strategic decisions based on how
someone else will act and react. Finally, games, information, strategies and
manager are the powerful tool of business strategy, therefore game theory is a
valuable habit of mind  and a way for executives to sharpen their thinking in
business and in life. (Mcmilan, 1996). This paper is focusing in the role of the
game in the business strategy and the needs of information due to the strategy
to win the game.
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II. THE NATURE OF THE GAME
A game is a formal representation of situation in which a number of
individuals interact in a setting of a strategic independence. (Mas Collel, 1995).
In the game normally there will be players, the rules, the outcome and the payoffs.
Players which is normally formed as two peoples or two different agent with different
characteristics which interacts each others, framing by the rules of the game an
outcome is concerning with the action of the player with respect to the payoff
that become preferences over the possible outcome.
Basic assumptions of game theory are (Gibbons, 1996; Mas Collel, 1995):
1. Individuality (have their own interest)
2. Rationality (always want to maximize their interest / payoff)
3. Mutual interdependence (the action of each individual/ player depend on
the action of other players)
According to Von neuman (1944) game theory divided into broad areas: non-
cooperative game (strategic game) and cooperative game (coalitional) games.
Non-cooperative game concentrate on individual motivation (individual as
rational players); cooperative game concentrate on society as a whole, for example
: wars, strikes, etc. but this is an inefficient game. In other hand, Nash (1950)
claimed that one should be able to reduce all cooperative games into some non-
cooperative form (http://cepa.newschool.edu/het/schools/game.htm), that
position known as “Nash Programme” which are: Normal form game (static) and
extensive form game (dynamic).  The solution concept of the static game are :
Maximum minimum, Dominance criteria, Strategic stability or Nash Equilibrium
(NE) also can be with Mixed Strategy NE with best response correspondence.
III. INFORMATION AND THE GAME
Game is any decision under uncertainty (Colman, 1982); ( Mas-Collel,
1995);  in order to solve the game we need to know the type of information that
we have. There are two types of information : a complete information and
incomplete information. In  this situation, complete means : we know the types
of other players, know their preferences, and know their payoffs. Conversely,
incomplete information do not have such those information that have been
mentioned in the complete information.
Players of the game have to do some action for their strategy because
strategy is a predetermined ‘programme of play’ that tells her what actions to
take in response to every possible strategy other players might use (http://
plato.stanford.edu/entries/game-theory/#Mot), and information is needed to do
an action which can be classified as perfect and imperfect information. Perfect
information means that we know who move first, and imperfect information we
do not know the action of other player movement, It might be move simultaneously
or sequential. There are four types of the game:
1. Strategic games (= normal form games)
2. Bayesian games (= games with incomplete information)
3. Extensive games (= games with perfect information, we know who moves
first)
4. Repeated games (the game is repeated. The players observe the outcome of
previous game before deciding their optimal response).
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A crucial aspect of the specification of a game involves the information
that players have when they choose strategies. The simplest games (from the
perspective of logical structure) are those in which agents have perfect information,
meaning that at every point where each agent’s strategy tells her to take an
action, she knows everything that has happened in the game up to that point. A
board-game of sequential moves  in which both players watch all the action (and
know the rules in common), such as chess, is an instance of such a game. By
contrast, the example of the bridge-crossing game of imperfect information, since
the fugitive must choose a bridge to cross without knowing the bridge at which
the pursuer has chosen to wait, and the pursuer similarly makes her decision
in ignorance of the actions of her quarry. Since game theory is about rational
action given the strategically significant actions of others, it should not surprise
you to be told that what agents in games know, or fail to know, about each others’
actions makes a considerable difference to the logic of our analyses, as we will
see. (http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/game-theory/#Mot)
IV. INFORMATION, DECISION AND GAME THEORY
Game theory is concern with the logic of decision making in social
situations in which the outcomes depend on decision of two or more autonomous
agents (Colman, 1982). Type of information is very important to the chosen
strategy. However the action of the players has to pay attention with the
information that they have. Symmetric and asymmetric information are
important things that influence the action of the players. Decision theory can be
viewed as a theory of one person games, or a game of single player against nature.
(Levine, http://levine.sscnet.ucla.edu/general/whatis.htm)
Choice under uncertainty has involves on that matter, means that
information for decision making process in this case as the formation of expected
utility functions and beliefs. Probability also can be used to represent the
uncertainty outcomes and Bayes law is frequently used to model therefore the
new information is used to revise beliefs. Decision theory is often used in the
form of decision analysis, which shows how best to acquire information before
making a decision (Levine, http://levine.sscnet.ucla.edu/general/whatis.htm)
V. PRISONERS DILEMMA
Prisoners dilemma is one of most famous example of game theory.
Although it was a classic example, it captures the critical features of many public
resource problems such as grazing ranges and ocean fisheries. But classically
in the game, a prisoner is better off confessing no matter what he thinks his
accomplice will do. Hence the outcome of the game has both prisoners confessing
and serving 5-year sentence. Note that both would have been better off if neither
confessed, but there is no way guaranteeing this “cooperative” outcome, because
each of prisoner has a strong private incentive to fink on the other.(Whinston, et
all, 1997)
The game among network competitors has some characteristics of
“Prisoners dilemma, everyone would be better off if each network manager adopted
optimal dynamic pricing, but each has a strong private incentive to lower prices
to attract more customers. The outcome is that everyone over utilize the public
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resource and is much worse off. Internet and the numbers of competitors in
other words could say:
“The classic assumption of many small price taking suppliers will be far
from the true, instead the internet market will be better describe as a
game with small numbers of strategic players.”
(Whinston, et all, 1997)
Unfortunately, beyond rather simplistic model the “Prisoners dilemma”
has no virtually predictive power in the complex dynamic environment. Even
with extremely simplified competitive network model may have no pure-strategy
non cooperative equilibrium. (Whinston, et all, 1997). Here is an example of
classical prisoners dilemma problem with using robin and collin as prisoners
who have been arrested for a crime action. (Prisoners’ Dilemma)
Consider two criminals, Robin (player I) and Collin (player II), who have
been arrested for a crime and are being interrogated separately whether the
other did the crime. If neither of them confess against the other, the evidence
against them is weak and they will be punished only for lesser charges. If this
happens, each will get three years in prison. If both testify against the other,
each will get two years in prison.
If only one testify against the other, the one who did not cooperate with the
police will
get four years in prison and the one who did cooperate will get no prison sentence.
Describe a strategy space of the players.
(Mas-Colell,1995); (Osborne, Martin J.,2004),
(http://plato.stanford.edu/entries/game-theory/#PD)
The depicted picture of strategy profile of the game in prisoners dilemma
has shown the important of strategy feature and information needs. With the
asymmetric information like prisoner, they have to search for the decision
solution which make them better off or even better if they can make pareto
solution (better off without making someone else worst off). In the business strategy
like in online or internet business they use to have asymmetric information
from the competitor. The idea of prisoners dilemma could give an alternative
solution for decision making process.
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VI. AUCTION
In the past, the way people sell the things are commonly using auction.
For example like English auction or Dutch auction for “Tulip”. But now, most of
the selling process moving to online transaction in order to optimizing the
increasing of information technology. Electronic buying with auction system like
“e buy” has a big influence in the e-commerce market. They made people like to
have bidding continuously, and many people realized that “e buy “ is the best
solution and also the cheapest way to sell or to buy something instead of going to
the shop, but still in this case physical shops are still appropriate for the customer.
Look for the definition of auction, can be a market mechanism in which
an object, service, or set of objects, is exchanged on the basis of bids submitted
by participants. Auctions provide a specific set of rules that will govern the sale
or purchase (procurement auction) of an object to the submitter of the most
favorable bid. The specific mechanisms of the auction include first and second
price auctions, and English and and Dutch auctions.
(http://www.gametheory.net/dictionary/Auctions/Auction.html)
English auction is A type of sequential second price auction in which an
auctioneer directs participants to beat the current, standing bid. New bids must
increase the current bid by a predefined increment. The auction ends when no
participant is willing to outbid the current standing bid. Then, the participant
who placed the current bid is the winner and pays the amount bid. A second
price auction is also known as a Vickrey Auction after William Vickrey who first
described it and pointed out that bidders have a dominant strategy to bid their
true values. While the highest bidder pays the amount bid, an English auction is
termed second-price since the winning bidder need only outbid the next highest
bidder by the minimum increment. Thus the winner, effectively, pays an amount
equal to (slightly higher than) the second highest bid.
(http://www.gametheory.net/dictionary/Auctions/EnglishAuction.html)
Dutch auction is a type of first price auction in which a “clock” initially
indicates a price for the object for sale substantially higher than any bidder is
likely to pay. Then, the clock gradually decreases the price until a bidder “buzzes
in” or indicates his or her willingness to pay. The auction is then concluded and
the winning bidder pays the amount reflected on the clock at the time he or she
stopped the process by buzzing in. These auctions are named after a common
market mechanism for selling flowers in Holland, but also reflects stores
successively reducing prices on sale items. ( http://www.gametheory.net/
dictionary/Auctions/DutchAuction.html)
Auction is the game with incomplete information, because player I do
not know the preferences of player II. They have only asymmetric information,
they only do the action with the strategy that they feel can make their win or
better off.
In the first price auction, the bidder has the probability 1 or 0 and uniformly
distributed [0, 1 ], the bidding procedure moves simultaneously. The higher bidder
wins the good and pays the price she / he bid. In the second price auction, all the
characteristics are the same except the winner of the bidding procedure only
pay the second highest price from the bidders to get the things.
The best response equilibrium solution is the best way to find the solution
of the game, therefore with the incomplete information we do not have so much
information from the competitor or in this case we can call as the other bidder.
Jurnal Infestasi 58Vol. 3 N0.1  2007
In the case of online bidding like e-buy, we are facing very difficult situation
with the lack of information about the competitor, incomplete and asymmetric
information, in this case even though we play with the simultaneously but we
have to choose an exact time to bid in order to win the game.
VII.  KEY ISSUE
The important key issue that we can emphasise for this paper is the role of the
game in the business strategy and in every day life. It is necessary to think
about the advantages for using the game theory to find the solution of every
problem that we have. In the business strategy although we found argument
like “cooperation may generate more ideas and better communication than
competition and lead to a more profitable business in the long run” (Daryl
Koehn,1997) , we can not always be so sure to choose strategy “ cooperate-
cooperate” instead of making better strategy with the help of information and
solution probability in facing the problem. Whilst, the condition of market is
become more conducive conducting to the condition of asymmetric and imperfect
information.
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